/21 cont./

793 *795 [34] building which does not have the importance of the Mosque of Touba, but which surpasses in elegance the other mosques of Senegal, and which, because of this, would merit having made on it the necessary and urgent repairs which certain parts that are very damaged and in very bad condition require at present.

But Bassirou does not have only this architectural interest; he is also concerned with crops. His experience with the Service de l'Agriculture not having given him satisfaction, he works in a more classical and traditional fashion near the village of Tip, located in the canton of Kaël some 30 kilometers to the south of Touba. This installation did not fail to provoke some protests on the part of the Peul stockbreeders of the canton, but these difficulties seem to have been settled amicably later on.

The third person in the brotherhood in the order of precedence is, as we have said, Cheikh M'Backé, eldest son of Amadou Moustapha and nephew of the two preceding men. Much younger than his uncles, he also has a very different demeanor. A tall, well-built, handsome, clean-shaven man, he has the bearing and the activities of a modern businessman. In fact, he is ambitious; he wants to succeed; he needs a great deal of money in order to realize his ambitions, and his very functions as a Murid marabout provide it for him.

We have seen that he had solicited, as the direct descendant of the founder, the post of caliph, but that he had been ousted in favor of his uncle. Since then he has always remained in more or less violent opposition to Falilou M'Backé. Nevertheless, he has not succeeded in detaching from the latter even a small fraction of the Murids. His opposition has sometimes been the cause of regrettable acts. In 1952, among others at the time of the elections to the Territorial Assembly, Cheikh M'Backé had made himself the champion of the S.F.I.O. when Falilou was supporting the B. D. S. (and undoubtedly because he was supporting it). This opposition provoked rather violent incidents in Touba during the electoral campaign, some talibés

●666 793 *795

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[55] Some months before there was established an African Independence Party, whose support remains very limited. [Cotonou is the capital of Dakomey.]

[56] Translator's note: the Mali Federation is the new state formed by the union of Senegal with the Sudanese Republic.

[p.20c]

668 E5 • 529

/21 cont./

793 of Cheikh, supporting the S. F. I. O., having gone so far as
*795 to throw stones into the "carré" of the Caliph-general. Cheikh
[666] had to restrain the socialist ardor of his talibés, who had gone too far. Such actions risk alienating from him the brotherhood /22/ and even the Administration, but he needs both in order to continue to carry on his policy.

His residence in Touba is located near the mosque, but on the opposite side from that of the Caliph-general. On the day of the Magal he tries to assemble there the greatest possible number of talibés in order to show his influence.

The cultivation of groundnuts is for him, too, an important source of revenue. His principal plantations are located at Taïf in the subdivision of Gossas, not far from the limits of that of M'Backé.

The other members of the M'Backé family have less influence on the life of the brotherhood. Nevertheless, they hold positions on the Murid Administrative Council, and they are settled around Touba and M'Backé.

[801] M'Backé Bousso heads an important Koranic school at Darou-Salam, just beside M'Backé. Abdoulaye M'Backé has settled at Boulel-Mody, at the extremity of the former valley of the
[312] Sine where, thanks to the permanent waterholes that exist at certain places in this dried-up thalweg, he has created rice-
[241] fields and orchards which complement his groundnut plantations, in the midst of which he lives. Modest and self-effacing in appearance, this M'Backé is in reality very rich and very influential, for he has as talibés principally salaried workers and city employees who send him a tithe from their salaries or their income.

Following the example of the direct descendants and collateral relatives of Amadou Bamba, his distant relatives, his allies, the descendants of his first collaborators have made themselves "Great Murid Marabouts." Spiritual and temporal leaders at the same time, instructing their disciples in the doctrine of the founder, and above all having them till the soil for them, these Sérignes have created in Baol and in adjacent

/25 cont./

793 and to receive the title of Cheikh, with the advantages which
* 795 that confers. While waiting, he works at hoeing and clearing
244 land without counting or measuring all the lands capable of pro-
[555] ducing the groundnuts which make up the fortune of his mara-
bout.

It is this way of colonizing the lands, and more particularly the new lands, which has made the brotherhood play an important role in the economy of Senegal in recent years. The Murid marabouts have been and remain clearers /26/ of land and large-
[433] scale producers of groundnuts. It can be estimated that they alone produce a little more than half of the total harvest of the Territory.

793 This brilliant picture is nevertheless not without shadows.
*795 Even though the influence of the Murid leaders is not dangerous
518 on the political level as a consequence of the good understanding which exists between them and the Administration, even though there is no reason to fear that they may incite the members of the brotherhood to insubordination, their presence in the villages does pose problems. There are problems when they have settled in villages whose chiefs are not Murids (if not, sometimes, anti-Murid). In these cases it often happens that there are collisions
[622] between the customary chiefs and the Murid marabouts, principally since the reforms of 1945 which diminished considerably the powers of the chiefs and their prestige in the eyes of the people at a time when the influence and glory of the marabouts were increasing. Many times the Murids of a canton want to obey
[632] only their religious leader and willfully ignore the canton chief. In addition, in the face of the invading agricultural activity of the Murids, the non-Murid populations stiffen themselves more and more and try to resist their agrarian encroachments. That sometimes creates quarrels; indeed it even provokes violent disorders which have to be arbitrated or stopped.

793 On the other hand, the recent political evolution which is
*795 resulting in giving the right to vote to all Senegalese men and
666 all Senegalese women has prompted the politicians to seek the collaboration and friendship of the Murid leaders... so that they

/26 cont./

793 will have their talibés vote in favor of their parties. When one
* 795 knows what the influence of the marabouts and the discipline
666 of the brotherhood are, one can easily imagine what a formidable
ace such an alliance can be for a party. But to be allied with one party is necessarily to be the adversary of the other (or others). If Murid fanaticism (and organization) is thrown into the electoral struggles, it can be the cause of serious troubles. Certainly these troubles would not compromise the loyalty of the brotherhood vis-à-vis the mother country, but they would create serious difficulties for the local administration and the government of the territory.

793 In other respects, deeper reasons can provoke lively op-
* 795 position or even struggles between the great Murid leaders and
[665] certain politicians (or certain parties). Thus some Senegalese political personalities are beginning to criticize the way the marabouts act against their talibés. One of them has gone so far as to utter the words "servitude" and "feudalism" in speaking of Muridism /27/ to a high European official. It is certain that a virulent campaign could be made on this theme against the Murid leaders and especially against those whose ostentatious luxury can excite jealousy.

For their part, the Murid marabouts try to maintain their authority and their influence over their disciples and, in that way, over the whole country. They will be opposed to any social or political innovation which will give more power to the masses, and which, by so doing, will risk compromising their authority, counterbalancing it, or even combatting it.
[654] They were thus hostile in 1953 to the transformation of the Société de Prévoyance of Baol into the Société Mutuelle de Production Rurale, on the one hand, because they thought that authority should not be entrusted to the people, and, on the other hand, because they feared that a S. M. P. R. presided over by an African (as was happening already at the time in the circle of Thiès) might be less favorable toward them than the traditional S. P. completely in the hands of the Administration.

/29 cont./

*795 [734] [735] any poor person can go to them to ask for alms and hospitality; he will be taken care of for a long time, and for nothing, and thus part of the funds collected by the marabouts is redistributed to their faithful in misfortune.

One must especially not lose sight of the fact that Muridism is /30/ an integral part of Islam, even though it does not completely conform to orthodox Islam, even though it has abuses and faults. It is primarily a spiritual force, and it is necessary that political and social evolution, indispensable to the young country of Senegal, does not take place against Muridism, against Islam, against all spirituality.

*795 ●666 648 It is known that the Senegalese marabouts in general and the Murid leaders in particular, on the occasion of the Referendum of September 28, were definitely in favor of the Franco-African Community. This attitude can not be explained solely, as some might insinuate, by their desire to preserve certain relations with France, whose pro-Islamic policy has always been favorable and profitable for them. The true reason for this choice is that, on the one hand, the marabouts well know the present state of the intellectual and political development of their compatriots, and, on the other hand, they want to defend their religion and its spiritual values.

They know that at the present time the advanced wing of the political and syndicalist world groups together advanced young people who are quite far from any religious practice and thought and very violently pro-Marxist, if not pure Marxists.

They probably feared that, by means of an independence as premature as absolute, the present leaders, moderate on the whole, would be very quickly left behind by the extremists and that these would then institute in Senegal a materialistic and atheistic regime to which true and good Moslems would not be able to rally, and from which, probably, the whole of the population would rapidly suffer.

*795 But the development of this prospect would carry us too far. Let us content ourselves, in conclusion, to bring it up and to

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
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9,000,000 most of whom were illiterate. Balzac, in 1845, 648
wrote in his book *Les paysans*:

> For twenty million beings in France the law is merely a piece of white paper stuck on the door of the Church or the Town Hall . . . Many mayors of cantons turn their copies of the *Bulletin des Lois* into bags for holding raisins and seeds. As for the mere mayors of communes you would be shocked by the number who cannot read or write and by the way in which the civil registers are kept.

Most remarkable of the innovations of the short lived French Second Republic of 1848-52, in which the Revolution once more came into its own, was the granting of the right to Senegal of sending a deputy to the National Assembly in France. Grandly it was announced, 'The Colonies purified of slavery . . . will be represented in the National Assembly'. Effectively, such a deputy would be representing an overwhelming majority of African 'citizens' for metropolitan Frenchmen numbered then only some 500. However it was to take some time before the African citizens were to use this newly acquired right to elect one of their own number to the Assembly. [562] [563] [666]

The 1848 Revolution thus embroidered on the 1833 ordinance of the French monarchy by introducing a full scale assimilationist policy for the colonies of France. In Senegal it affected only a small number of people. And never again would France in her expansion through Africa apply this trend in her colonial policy so liberally to her newly acquired territories. Thereafter there was to be a tussle with those administrators who either felt that the inhabitants of the colonial territories were different and should be treated as such, or were overwhelmed by the practical problems involved in applying an assimilationist policy to a largely illiterate population spread over an area eight times the size of France.

The reaction to the liberal thinking of the second republic soon came with Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* by which an authoritarian Second Empire was established. In 1854 the right of electing a deputy was withdrawn from all

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
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643 writing in 1889, protested against this attitude since he felt Faidherbe,
641 that to make monogamy a condition of citizenship would break up families and that monogamy should be achieved by education. But more potent were those forces which disliked the exercise of such rights by a small African minority, albeit linked with Europeans, which could so often obstruct not only the Governor of Senegal but the Governor-General himself, since until 1904 these two were one and the same man. The existence of a vocal General Council and Municipal Councils, let alone a deputy in France, which could all express opinions directly hostile to the authoritarian rule of the Governor, was another important factor behind the moves to deprive the Senegalese of their citizenship at the end of the nineteenth century. There was also
• 666 however quite genuine concern at the way in which the vote
641 was exercised in Senegal. Pierre Mille, in an article entitled *The Black Vote in Senegal* published in 1901, alleged that the African voters, mainly illiterate, were controlled by the handful of Europeans who bought their votes. He went so far as to describe Senegal as a 'rotten borough'. Indeed he alleged that the expense of the election absorbed a large part of the colony's finances: and further that after competing against each other for the electors' favour, the big companies in Senegal finally decided to combine the operation to save expenses and control Senegal to their mutual advantage. But as to the virtue of the Senegalese
641 as citizens in other respects Mille was surprisingly warm:
[595] 'Having become French citizens and notwithstanding that they were Muslims, they, with a few exceptions, accepted monogamy . . . and they have spread far and wide in Africa the renown and justice of French administration'. But as
648 Mille concluded, this was not sufficient to persuade France to continue the experiment in her other West African colonies. Indeed, confirming what has already been said about empirical tendencies in French colonial rule, by 1900, when France had gained most of her vast African empire, Mille commented that it was 'administered with an

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Such was the outcry against this decree that a further decree in 1914 confirmed that 'all natives born in the four communes would be subject to French tribunals throughout the colony and in certain other places'. Indeed Lamine Guèye was one of the most ardent critics of France for her failure to accord the full rights of an assimilationist policy to the *originaires*. He protested against the way the Government opposed 'the entrance of all natives of whatever status they may be, into the general administrative services, even into military units stationed in the colony'. It was only by insistence on the right to do military service on equal terms with the French that the *originaires* were finally able to gain confirmation of their rights as citizens. In 1914 Blaise Diagne became the first Senegalese to sit in the Chamber of Deputies. He won his seat partly as a result of the split vote amongst his six European opponents, partly because he appealed to the Senegalese voters by his demands for complete equality between black and white. His particular platform was a pledge to vote for a law for obligatory military service without distinction of race or colour. In a letter to the Minister of Colonies he said the *originaires* did not want the privileges without the obligations of French citizenship. At the time, of course, France was just about to enter into the Great War and badly needed troops from Africa. Thus without much difficulty a law was passed providing for the conscription of the *originaires* as French troops. In return for Diagne's co-operation in recruiting troops for the war effort, the Government passed the Citizenship Law of 1916 which once and for all confirmed the status of the *originaires*. They could retain their *statut personnel* and need not understand French to be considered as citizens. 'The natives of the *communes de pleine exercice* and their descendants are and remain French citizens subject to the military obligations of the Law of 19 October 1915.' The rider about the status of 'descendants' was of particular importance to Lamine Guèye who was born in Soudan of *originaire* parents.

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MS37 Senegal MS37

641 648 [643] An interesting sidelight on the confused French attitude towards assimilation and Africans was the status accorded to Blaise Diagne as Commissioner of the Republic in charge of conscription of troops in West Africa. He was given rank equal to that of the Governor-General, Van Vollenhoven, who thereat resigned. However this is only one side of the story. The French insist that he resigned because he felt that the large number of troops to be recruited would wreck the colony's economy and severely reduce the indigenous population. Nevertheless the presence of an African deputy for Senegal was not viewed well in all quarters. But Diagne could not be tempted by high office outside the parliamentary sphere and won a resounding victory in the 1919 elections [666] with 7,444 votes to his opponent's 1,252. He was then appointed Under Secretary of States for Colonies. His essential attachment to France was clear, for whilst in 1919 he became President of the Pan-African Congress, which urged that ultimately 'Africa should be ruled by consent of the Africans . . .' he refused, as Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff have pointed out 'to support any revolutionary theories as to the emancipation of all Negro peoples'. 'We French natives', he said, 'wish to remain French, since France has given us every liberty'.

646 633 The French were still not happy about the position of the *originaires* and in 1920, not so much from a show of liberalism as from a desire to reduce the pressures exercised on the Administration by the twenty-member General Council, it was translated into a Colonial Council with an increased membership of forty-four of which twenty were sent by the hitherto unrepresented Protectorate. The representatives [631] of the *sujets*, who were provincial or cantonal chiefs, could be relied on to vote with the Administration whose agents they were, and thus reduce the independence of the communes. In 1925, however, the number of chiefs was reduced to sixteen and the citizens' representatives increased to twenty-four as a means of persuading them to vote larger

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
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641 they were made agents of the Administration and responsi-
[631] ble for the enforcement of the corvée when required. The harshness of this authoritarian rule, escaped only by the *evolués* in the other territories, has been vividly described by Geoffrey Gorer in *Africa Dances*, which records a long tour made through French West Africa in the mid-thirties. Even so in 1930 France had signed the Geneva Act for-
[466] bidding forced labour in the colonies; but it was slow to disappear. In 1937 the right to form trade unions, which
[467] hitherto was only granted to Senegalese citizens by a law of 1920, was extended in a restricted form to the *sujets*. That same year a new decree allowed easier conditions for the acquisition of French citizenship by the *sujets*. Out of a population of 1,800,000 in 1936 there were 78,000 citizens compared with some 2,400 in the rest of French West Africa. And in 1939 the *sujets* were granted the right of
[666] electing some of their representatives to the Colonial Council instead of being represented only by nominees of the Administration.

641 This newly acquired right was enjoyed for a very brief
648 period. For in 1940 the authoritarian element in France came to the fore in particularly unhappy circumstances with the fall of France and the establishment of the Vichy Government. Under the Vichy regime, racism manifested itself openly for the first time. This was particularly embittering for the Senegalese élite since they had been much in sympathy with the Popular Front Government which attempted liberal experiments in Algeria and Syria. All Senegalese representative institutions were suppressed. Priority was given to Europeans in rationed goods and in many other spheres. Liberty of association was withdrawn from both races, and whilst European members of the resistance were rarely hanged, Africans themselves rarely escaped the supreme penalty. By contrast in France the future President of Senegal, Léopold Sédar Senghor, was fighting in the French resistance and was later interned in a German concentration camp.

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Senegal had never in fact been free from elements of racism, though such a policy was never officially countenanced until the Vichy regime. Geoffrey Gorer found many instances of discrimination in Dakar, and actually went as far as to say that 'The colour bar is extremely strong in Dakar'. But he concluded 'these French citizens are far happier than their brother French Negro subjects; if they are too badly cheated or abused they have some redress in the law courts'. The colour bar was certainly not official policy then as it became under the Vichy Administration.

The Vichy regime marks the end of an era in West Africa and particularly in Senegal. Until 1940 there had been little or no opposition to French assimilationist policy by the Africans. Indeed they were the first to criticise any deviations from it. Blaise Diagne enjoyed high status in France, and though he was accused by his critics of corruption and of selling himself to the French he remained the popular choice in Senegal until his death.

At the ensuing election Galandou Diouf defeated Blaise Diagne's old opponent, Lamine Guèye, who was instrumental in the formation of the Senegalese branch of the *S.F.I.O.* Hitherto elections had been largely fought on the basis of personal followings, with the exception of the European-dominated *Parti Socialiste Sénégalais* founded in 1929 in which Europeans played a prominent role. Not only was Lamine Guèye the first Senegalese to realise the value of the party machine, but he was also the first to advocate the granting of full political and legal rights to all French Africans. Significantly he did not suggest any form of break with France, rather that France should carry her assimilationist policy to its logical conclusions. In 1939 he increased his political backing considerably when the *P.S.S.* fused with his section of the *S.F.I.O.* and this was to make him a leading member of the party in the metropolis as well as in Senegal.

However the younger generation of Senegalese were

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VI. TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

The choice of the Senegalese people is independence; they want it to take place only in friendship with France, not in dispute.

LÉOPOLD SÉDAR SENGHOR (September 1958)

IT was not until 1951 that Senghor was able to test the strength of his new party at the elections for the French National Assembly in which it gained both seats with 213,000 votes to the *S.F.I.O.*'s 90,000. His success was proved the next year when he won forty-one out of the fifty seats in the *Conseil-General* under the new and greatly enlarged franchise. His vote came overwhelmingly from the 'bush', since Lamine Guèye still retained strong support in Dakar and St. Louis. The party ticket was a popular one: accusing the French Administration of supporting socialists in the towns and chiefs in the bush.

From a theoretical standpoint as we have seen the *B.D.S.* fitted into the new anti-assimilationist trend in Senegal. It represented the 'unsophisticated' bush against the Gallicised *citoyens* of the *Quatre Communes*. It demanded a return to African values and had an essentially African-style organisation in the bush. But few real differences showed themselves on the platforms adopted by the two parties at the elections.

In the French National Assembly Senghor had joined forces with a number of other deputies from African territories who like himself did not wish to link themselves with one of the metropolitan parties. This group was known as the *Indépendents d'Outre Mer*. As a result of the elections the *I.O.M.* gained thirteen seats, enough to form a recognised group in the National Assembly. However they were never able to mould themselves into a united federal party on the lines of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (*R.D.A.*)

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MS37 Senegal MS37

develop its own personality.' The *S.F.I.O.* parties of Africa met in Conakry to found a new socialist party entirely African in basis, called the *Mouvement Socialiste Africain*. Thus after over twenty years Lamine Guèye officially broke one of Senegal's closest links with France. At the same time Senghor called a congress of his allies in other territories from the *I.O.M.* and formed a federal party called the *Convention Africaine*. There were thus three new major African parties, with sections in most of the eight territories of West Africa and some in *A.E.F.*, each preaching African unity. But the federal executive, the very structure through which this could be maintained, was missing.

At the *loi cadre* elections that took place at the end of March 1957, the *R.D.A.*, the most thoroughly organised on the ground, proved the strongest party of the three and in West Africa and gained overwhelming majorities in Soudan, Guinea and Ivory Coast, dominated the coalition in Upper Volta and provided the opposition in Niger and Dahomey. But the party, as was soon proved at the long delayed Bamako Conference of September 1957, was far from united. Its main difference was over the problem of the federal executive. Its President, Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast had, as a Minister in the French Government, been one of the principal architects of the *loi cadre* and was opposed to the creation of a federal executive. The *R.D.A.*'s very dynamic Vice-President, Sékou Touré of Guinea, formed in the tough school of trade unionism, however championed the creation of a federal executive, and in this respect he was closer to Senghor than to his own party chief. At the Bamako Conference Sékou Touré persuaded the party to adopt it as a prime objective.

Meanwhile in Senegal, ever the source of new things, was born the first African party with the avowed object of independence, the *P.A.I.* (*Parti Africain de l'Indépendence*) led by Majhemout Diop, who had strong Communist sympathies. Till then the word independence had been

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
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majority party had been made, however, there was little doubt as to the outcome of the Referendum. But the seeds of independence had been sown.

Almost immediately after the Referendum the planners got down to work seeking to create the federal executive that had escaped them under the *ancien régime*. Guinea meanwhile had become independent and there was a certain satisfaction amongst those who voted Yes at the difficulties so abrupt a break with France entailed. Alas, as was later realised, Guinea independent and the rest still within the Community, meant the first crack in the old federation. On 29 December delegates from Senegal, Soudan, Upper Volta and Dahomey, together with observers from Mauretania, met to consider the possibility of creating a new federation.

On 17 January 1959 a federal constitution was promulgated with the accord of all four governmental delegations, and the new Mali came into being. However pressures from France and from Houphouët-Boigny, who still bitterly opposed any form of federation, soon forced Upper Volta and Dahomey to withdraw, reducing Mali to two member states: Senegal and Soudan.

The new federation was short lived. In Soudan there had been almost unanimous support for the federation, but in Senegal a number of religious chiefs, in association with Ibrahim Seydou N'Daw, formerly President of the Senegalese Assembly, and an important member of the governing *U.P.S.* party, formed the Senegalese Solidarity Party and together with the two left-wing parties, the *Parti Africain de l'Indépendence* and the *P.R.A.*—Senegal campaigned against the proposed federation. At the polls the Government won a resounding victory.

Thus in both Senegal and Soudan the leaders who had chosen the path of federation won triumphant approval, though as Mamadou Dia admits somewhat ruefully, the people followed their leaders blindly on this question. It is essential here to note that the two countries were

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

immense impact of the town. They live in small villages made up of relations and fellow villagers. They even club together, subscribing to a common fund to receive their fellows from the Fleuve, and as far as work is concerned they virtually monopolise certain jobs such as bootboys, waiters, and newspaper sellers. This maintenance of tribal cohesion is a difficult task in this city of French creation, where a new community of Dakarois is rapidly coming into existence.

An important factor in the breakdown of tribal ties has been the creation of political parties and the creation of a new political élite that thinks in national terms. Experience in Africa has shown, however, that this can work two ways, for many political parties are in effect organisations intended to defend ethnic interests. Senegalese politics have on the whole been remarkably free from tribalism, though Senghor did in fact achieve much of his success in the early days of the *B.D.S.* though the emphasis he laid on ethnic considerations in the organisations of his party, and certainly there have existed specifically regional and ethnic parties like *Le Mouvement Démocratique Casamançais* and the *Union Générale de la Vallée du Fleuve.* But, as Kenneth Robinson pointed out in his study of Senegalese politics in *Five Elections in Africa*, these ethnic and regional aspects were compensated for by the federal aspect of the major party, *Le Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais.* In 1954, in fact, all ethnic and regional sub-sections of the *B.D.S.* were abolished and individual membership was insisted on. But though this led to the breaking-away of certain elements in the Casamance, it would be fair to say that the party has been much less dominated by those regional differences that normally influence political parties in West Africa. Nevertheless, as Robinson found in the 1957 election, there were a number of constituencies where ethnic rivalries were more important than political issues. At Linguère, a single member constituency, the population was divided between Fula and Wolof in the proportion of three to two. When the sitting member, a Fula, was

[i.e., The Moors and Toucouleurs in Dakar--Analyst]

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MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

renominated, the Wolofs created a *Bloc Démocratique du Djollof* which polled 6,000 votes to the 8,000 of the Fula candidate.

A further commentary on the lack of tribalism in Senegal is the ethnic structure of the Government and the national assembly. The Government is composed of the President of the Republic, who is a Serer, a President of the Council of Ministers who is Toucouleur with strong Wolof ancestry, and fourteen Ministers of whom nine are Wolof, two are half-caste, one a Frenchman who has opted for Senegalese nationality, one a Diola and one a Lebou.

The ethnic repartition of the Senegalese National Assembly is equally revealing*:

Tribe	*Percentage of population*	*Number of Deputies*	*Percentage of Deputies*
Wolof	35·0	33	41
Serer	16·0	5	6
Lebou	0·2	10	13
Toucouleur	9·0	10	13
Fula	17·0	5	6
Diola	9·0	5	6
Mandingo/Bambara	7·0	3	4
European	0·1	3	4
Metis	0·1	5	6
Rest	4·7	1	1

The above figures, with the reservations footnoted, show that the National Assembly with one or two exceptions

* These figures were supplied to me by William J. Foltz and are based on his own research and ethnic data from the *S.E.R.E.S.A. Rapport General* 1ère partie, Ch. 1., p. 38. The population figures are based on old administrative censuses, which may be somewhat conservative. The figures for the Lebou seem surprisingly low. Furthermore, placing deputies under a particular ethnic grouping is often an arbitrary process, since it is in the educated classes that the highest rate of inter-ethnic marriage occurs. Furthermore the large number of Wolofs can partly be explained by the fact that anyone of mixed ethnic origin, in which one parent is Wolof, tends to call himself Wolof.

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the rest animists. Of course this includes the exclusively Muslim Mandingo inhabitants of the Casamance who have been largely responsible for this proselytisation. The Diola too is inclined more and more to imitate his Mandingo and Wolof neighbours. L. V. Thomas, who has written a monumental study on the Diola, fears: 'Soon the Diola country may be, at least in its landscape, like Senegal if no power intervenes to limit the extension of the bushfire; it will certainly become, in its people, just another African country, where only a few anthropological remains fixed by heredity will enable us to distinguish the Diola from the Wolof or the Mandingo.'

The Casamance may well be coming closer to the rest of the Senegal, but it still remains a seat of opposition to the Government of Senghor and Dia, and votes heavily for the opposition *P.R.A.-Sénégal*. However neither of the leaders of this party, Ly Abdoulaye or Assane Seck, is *Casamançais*, and there is strong support in many towns for the *U.P.S.*, which indicates that Diola-Casamance politics are not necessarily either regional or tribal, though these are important factors.

The main social problem of the Senegal, and one which both assimilation and religion seem to have been unable to break down, is that of caste or a class structure very similar to caste. All the main Senegalese tribes—the Wolof, Lebou, Toucouleur, Serer—are divided into a series of endogamous castes. These castes differ slightly from tribe to tribe, but roughly they are divided thus:

Nobles and Freeborn
Artisans (jewellers, smiths, weavers, leatherworkers)
Griots or minstrels
Liberated slaves
Slaves

(Of course domestic slaves no longer exist as such in Senegal, but families know who their slaves were.)

It is certainly easier in Senegal for a Toucouleur noble to marry a Wolof noble than to marry a woman of inferior

8:Mercier E-5 (ca.1955) 1960
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369 633 175 [641] the two cities with the abolition of slavery in 1848.[16] The four coastal cities were elevated to the status of communes with full powers between 1872 and 1887, and the organization of political life on a European pattern in the four communes crystalized the opposition between the citizens of the old settlements and the subjects of the territories in the newly-conquered interior. The cities alone provided apprenticeship in public life and in the representative system. Beginning in 1871 they elected a deputy to the French Parliament. In 1879 they [646] elected a Council-general patterned after those in France, supposedly to represent all Senegal. It actually represented only the few urban centers, whose interests at the time diverged widely from those of the rest of Senegal. An effort was subsequently made to repair this breach by transforming the Council-general into a colonial council, consisting of representatives elected by the citizens and representatives for the non-citizens appointed by the *notables*.[17] This reduced conflicts scarcely at all. Meanwhile, citizenship [641] acquired new importance. At first it was established by local law and had no effect in other French territories. Not until 1916 did the "natives of the four communes" receive full French citizenship while still being able to retain their personal status. These citizens were few in [160] number: scarcely 80,000 in 1939, about 100,000 in the 1950's. The cities tended to include more non-citizens than citizens as they grew. Actual participation in politics developed only gradually. At [666] the first legislative elections, in 1871, only a third of those registered voted, and the rate dropped to less than a fifth

[P-8A]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
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369 633 175 in some years. Since the beginning of the 20th century, however, urban citizens have taken an increasingly lively interest in political matters.[18]

[666] In this restricted political system the relative importance of the roles played by 563 different ethnic groupings and different 668 cities varied continuously. Ethnic dominance, first held by the old European families, passed gradually to mixed-blood society, which came into being in the 18th century and rapidly acquired wealth, education, and influence. By the mid-19th century mixed-bloods made up the majority of the westernized population. But the entry of the emancipated slaves, [166] the first sizable migration toward the cities, quickly reduced the mixed-bloods to a minority. In 1900 they numbered [162] less than 5,000 in the four communes together, though for several decades their economic and political influence remained quite disproportionate to their numbers. 668 Among the cities, St. Louis was [369] predominant until WW I. At the beginning of the century it practically controlled the deputation to the French legislature and the Council-general — and hence the economic life of the territory. Then Gorée-Dakar came to the fore;[19] in 1914 a citizen of Gorée, Blaise Diagne, was elected deputy, followed by Galandou Diouf and Lebou. These men were the first elected Senegalese to win [645] broad support at Paris; Diagne himself was appointed a Secretary of State [a subministerial post, equivalent to a U.S. Under-Secretary]. In Senegal, the au- [642] thority of elected officials — deputies and Councillors-general — increased, and clashes with the civil administration were frequent.[20]

[P. 8 B]

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[16] Which nearly tripled the number of citizens, who henceforth comprised a body that was more heterogeneous but less completely "assimilated."
[17] Translator's note: the *notables* were influential residents appointed to high political offices in the interior by the local representative of French government.
[18] Especially after 1914, when there appeared a particularly dynamic personnage, Blaise Diagne, whose popularity was widespread.
[19] Dakar absorbed Gorée in 1929. The latter was reestablished as a separate commune in 1956.
[20] At first — at the end of the 19th century — these were conflicts between the merchants, upholding the interests of their agencies, and the civil administration, then engaged in an expansionist policy in West Africa, whose advantages the former could not see. Not until recent years did these conflicts change very much in character.

[p.8c]

[966] [967] [642] [641] [195] 966 [323] 369

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

668 665 French party — the S.F.I.O.[23] — developed and for several years played a dominant role throughout Senegal. In the other territories parties were more often purely local, and simply allied themselves with the French parties. The S.F.I.O. lost its predominence in Senegal after 1951, but kept it in the four communes — St. Louis and Dakar-Gorée being its chief strongholds; it remained there as [666] the African Socialist Movement.[24] This result, the adoption of assimilationist views, was to a certain degree a characteristic of pre-war political life, but on the other hand it contributed to the leadership of the first party that tried to be at once interterritorial and specifically African: the African Democratic Assembly (R.D.A.). It provided some of the most radical elements in the movement, which received considerable support, especially at Dakar. Several radical leaders were the source of the conflicts that resulted in the split in the R.D.A. that followed the change of orientation after 1950. The R.D.A. was subsequently a rather marginal movement in Senegal. This second result suggests the strength of the relations of a party limited to the numerous elite of the old Senegalese cities with the great European currents of political thought.

[369] [666] But the greatest effect of the diversification of Senegalese political life was felt elsewhere. The appearance and rapid success of the Senegalese Democratic Bloc (B.D.S.) — which stemmed from a division in the S.F.I.O. — were the manifestations, in the political realm, of two essential facts: (1) the important changes that had taken place in the composition of city populations; and (2) the resumption of initiative by the rural populations, who seized the opportunity to express themselves directly, and especi-

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8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[21] A very significant portion of the present framework emerged from the "four communes."
[22] Until 1957, universal suffrage existed only in the four communes. In the rest of Senegal the franchise, which was very limited in 1946, was extended to more and more people. The organic law of 1956 abolished all restrictions.
[23] Translator's note: French section of the Workingmen's International: the French Socialist Party, attached to the old Second International.
[24] In 1956. The municipal elections of the same year showed clearly the extent of its influence, which was unimportant in the interior cities.

[P.9C]

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8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

668 ally to express themselves in opposition
665 to the old cities. The legislative elections
369 of 1951 were typical in this respect. The
●666 enlarged rural electorate had numerical control and held the key to success in the elections; a substantial part of the urban masses shared in an effort to drive a breach in the old system of urban domination. In this period the ideological aspects of the political parties were still unimportant. The elections of 1951 were a victorious revolt of the new citizens, urban and rural, against the old citizens of the "four communes."[25] The two candidates of the B.D.S. won. Significantly, one of them represented directly, through the unions, the new forces. The division between the whole of the territory and the cities was thus repeated *within* the cities. A new phase had commenced, one in which politics became more complicated. But the forms that can be termed "traditional" for political life were too deeply embedded within the patterns of urban life to give way at once.

Senegalese Political Life in Transition, 1953-1956

668 It was under such conditions that re-
665 searches were conducted on the forms of
[114] political expression in several Senegalese urban centers, chiefly at Dakar-Gorée and at St. Louis — that is, three of the four communes — and also at Thiès, a newer city in the interior close to and under the influence of the Dakar-Gorée-Rufisque aggregate. This last study provided certain comparative materials. This essay discusses only some of the findings of these researches. Three essential facts must be remembered:

(1) The importance retained by certain long-standing patterns. A party de-

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8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[25] At the time, the civil administration viewed this revolt rather favorably. Of course, it was only one aspect of the politics of the period. Some rather contradictory alliances were formed to oppose the S.F.I.O.

[26] Assuming a limited sense for the word "political," by applying it solely to party organizations.

[27] *Cf.* P. Mercier, "Evolution des élites sénégalaises," *Bull. intl. des Sci. soc.*, VIII (#4, '56). Materials for comparison appear, *mutatis mutandis*, in E.-F. Frazier, *Bourgeoisie noire*, Paris, 1956.

[28] Senegalese Populist Movement and Senegalese Democratic Union.

[29] This involved solely the male population.

[P.10C]

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8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

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369 the assertion that the temporary population, especially the seasonal one, shared very little in urban politics.[30] However, the groupings under study clearly extended beyond the nucleus of the "old population," which in Dakar was less sharply defined and more conglomerate than in a center such as St. Louis.[31] The traits peculiar to the latter were still discernible, however: thus, the majority ethnic group — Lebou and Wolof, which includes the largest number of "old urban families" — exhibited these political characteristics in a more striking form. Exact data gathered on extended family groups revealed political party membership varying from 50 to 80 per cent among the Lebou and Wolof (as much among women as among men); in these cases, membership was verified by possession of a party card. This verification was not required in the course of the general study previously noted; one may thus assume that some of the men interviewed who declared themselves members of a party were only sympathizers, or had failed to have their cards renewed. Other data, however, confirmed the validity of the information obtained. Thus, during the post-war years the Senegal branch of the S.F.I.O. was among the six most important branches of the party; in the mid-1950's the enormous majority of its adherents were to be found in the coastal cities.

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W [665]

One peculiarity, examined in the course of this essay, requires at least a partial interpretation. Considering the massive party membership, participation in elections was scanty. Thus, at the time of the last municipal elections in Dakar, the number of persons registered to vote exceeded 50,000.[32] According to the

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8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
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census of 1955, one might have expected it to reach nearly 80,000. Abstentions — in relation to the number registered — amounted to about 30 per cent. In this trend one can see the ambiguity that typified political life in the Senegalese cities. Evidence was also gathered on the status of participation in the other phases of party activity. Parties are organized in ward sections, sometimes with separate sections for women. The activities of these sections do not merit detailed study; they vary too greatly in intensity. One point became clear, however, from direct observation on one hand and the results of a series of interviews on the other: these sectional activities drew only a very limited portion — about 10 per cent — of party effectives. By contrast, occasional demonstrations might draw considerable numbers, including individuals from outside the city. Sometimes such demonstrations coincided with propaganda meetings organized directly by the party. In other cases they stemmed from the presence of a party leader as an observer at an official reception, a conference, etc.

Other facts also demonstrate that party membership does not imply militant action in the specifically political arena. A series of interviews carried out during 1953-1954 revealed only a slight degree of ideological unity in the two large parties, the S.F.I.O. and the B.D.S.; knowledge about specific phases of their programs was generally modest or nonexistant. Hence distribution of party memberships scarcely involved a precise ideological choice.[33] This choice to some degree reflected an actual distinction,[34] but this was apparently no more than a tendency. In addition to the primary

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8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[30] But it could remain attached more or less firmly to the political activities of the place of its origin.
[31] It included elements from St. Louis and Gorée, Lebou elements that had become urbanized "on the spot," etc. The population of Dakar tripled 1936-1956, from 80,000 to nearly 250,000.
[32] To be precise, 52,250. These elections are used as an example because the new organization for the city government involved a revision of the electoral lists, the most extensive in many years; and, also, a comparison with recent census figures (compiled in 1955) was possible for the first time.
[33] The facts of the split between the latent ideological content of judgments and opinions of a political sort, and that of the party programs, are noted below. Of course, there were probably distinctions according to level of schooling.
[34] Roughly, between old and new city-dwellers.

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[227] [691] 322 362

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
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cause of this peculiarity, described previously, there were secondary causes, of ethnic, religious, and other natures. Their action contributed to the blurring of lines between the party groups. These facts explain, for example, why the B.D.S., until its recent changes, was unable despite great efforts to change the nature of urban politics. Only the broad action of new factors that were felt considerably beyond the frontiers of Senegal, from 1956 on, brought some change.

These widespread occurrences affected chiefly the two large parties. The other parties, the M.P.S. and U.D.S., which had developed from the schism in the R.D.A., had a quite different nature. They were parties of activists, and in Senegalese political life had only secondary importance. The successes of the R.D.A. elsewhere in West Africa, even during 1956-1957, had only feeble repercussions in Senegal. This fact had many causes, which cannot be studied here. By contrast, the S.F.I.O. and the B.D.S. were tending to become, in terms of number, parties with mass support; their cores were made up as much by "*notables*" and "elected agents" as by activists. The struggle between these two parties continued to dominate the stage, if not in all Senegal, at least in the cities and in certain rural districts.[35] In some cases it took extremely violent forms.

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Pre-election riots were common between 1946 and 1956. Even in 1957, rather serious incidents marked the reorganization of the commune of Dakar, before the last municipal elections.[36] For the first time, elements of the B.D.S. (now the Senegalese Populist Bloc, or B.P.S.) won strong representation in the city council, previously dominated without opposition by the S.F.I.O. (now the African Socialist Movement — M.S.A.); an outburst of partisan passions marked

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665 [369] [666] this shift. Such demonstrations revealed the intense hostility between the two main parties. This deeply influenced urban life, in the realms that overlapped into the specifically political domain.

Some indications have been given as to the significance of party membership. They can be supplemented by approaching the problem somewhat differently. To a considerable degree, the parties remained closely associated with the "clienteles" that typified pre-war political life. This trait appeared most clearly in the party in power, the one that controlled the city government. To maintain and increase [669] such a political clientele, the party had access to very important instruments. Through the numerous municipal employees and all others who depended upon city hall, or who directly or indirectly benefited from its aid or its support, it extended a very wide network of influence. This was elaborated by the other network of influence, comprising the traditionally influential individuals, who were partly interwoven into it.[37] If a party had such a basis its dynamic force dropped considerably, and the role of its leaders assumed major importance. The prestige of the leader was essential to the cohesion of the political groups. This fact came out clearly in various researches. For instance, in the course of over 100 interviews it appeared that there were wide gaps between the official orientation of the party to which the respondent belonged and the political goals that he expressed.[38] Adherence to the leader overcame that difference to some extent. A certain formalization of partisan attachment thus appeared, in a primitive fashion. The importance of the leader's prestige was revealed with the greatest clarity in relation to the feminine clientele of the parties. It must be emphasized that at Dakar, at least among the [369]

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[35] Where the rivalry, furthermore, was chiefly between the "outposts," in this case more or less connected with the tradition of the "old cities," and the surrounding countryside.
[36] The separation of Gorée and the anticipated electoral redistricting had persuaded the civil administration to dissolve the municipal council and to replace it during the electoral period with a bipartisan municipal commission.
[37] Particularly in their activity as electoral agents.
[38] In a general way, these goals showed a much more definite "nationalist" potential.

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8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

668 this clearly; it was under this two-fold
665 pressure that the B.P.S. took a position in favor of "yes." It likewise accounts for the less extreme attitudes often taken by leaders within the new Mali Federation.[56] However, this influence of tradition is not sufficient to block new trends. It is significant that in the legislative
• [666] elections of March, 1959, the Senegalese Solidarity Party (P.S.S.), a combination of conservative city and rural elements, was as thoroughly defeated at St. Louis, where victory seemed probable, as in the rural districts. Again, it should be noted that the youthful elements that entered the B.P.S. in 1956 have in part left the new Senegalese Progressive Union (U.P.S.), an offshoot of the latter party after the regrouping noted above. By founding the African-Senegalese Regroupment Party (P.R.A.-S.), they have hoped to express their disappointment with a party insufficiently radical, insufficiently organized in structure, and containing too many aspects of the "traditional" political life of the old cities.

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22:Winterbotham et al. K-4 (no date) 1944 MS37 Senegal MS 31

633 The Council has the same functions as that of the colony, but its
645 decisions need the approval (usually formal) of the Standing
[648] Committee of the Governor-General's Council.

The Executive Councils of Senegal and of Dakar are known as *conseils privés*, whereas those of the other colonies are known as *conseils d'administration*.

646 *The Colonial Council of Senegal.* The history of the Colonial
633 Council and of its predecessor, the General Council, has been given above. The earlier council had jurisdiction over the four full communes only, but its successor, which dates from 1920, when all distinctions between colony and protectorate were abolished, has jurisdiction over the whole colony. The inhabitants of the District of Dakar still retain their votes for the Colonial Council, and as a corollary the Council can discuss the affairs of the District. The pretext for this decision was afforded by the provision, in the decrees
[C52] of 1924, that the Colonial Budget of Senegal should contain a grant in aid of Dakar; but French writers do not disguise the fact that it was thought not desirable entirely to divorce the District from the rest of Senegal. The decrees of 1924, therefore, expressly left it an integral, though autonomous, part.

646 The Colonial Council is unique in French Africa in that its
666 membership includes Europeans, natives, chiefs, citizens, and sub-
[642] jects. It is, therefore, worthy of detailed mention. Its constitution and powers are laid down in a decree of 4 December 1920, as amended by decrees of 30 March 1925, 13 January 1930, and 8 April 1939. This last added the subjects. The colony is divided into four electoral districts, from which members are elected on a population basis. The Council is elected for a term of six years, but, on the recom-
[648] mendation of the Governor, it may be dissolved by the Governor-General. Should a dissolution occur, a new election must be held within three months. There are 62 members in all: 26 citizens elected by citizens, 18 provincial or canton chiefs elected by those of the same rank, and 18 native subjects. These subjects must either have been born in the colony or be descendants of subjects born in
[641] the colony; they must have completed their military service; and they are elected by all other subjects who fulfil the same conditions. In 1929 the European element only numbered one-fifth of the total membership, and the additions made in 1939 will have had the effect of swamping it.

646 The Council meets for a fortnight's session once a year, but it can
643 be summoned by the Governor at any time. It chooses its own